Cegah strategi -rintang nuklear dalam konflik India-Pakistan
List of Authors
  • Komathi Manian , Ravichandran Moorthy

Keyword
  • Cegah-rintang nuklear, konflik bersenjata, perang, India, Pakistan

Abstract
  • Konflik India-Pakistan adalah konflik terpanjang dan antara yang paling sengit di era pasca-kolonial. Konflik ini mula wujud selepas ‘Pemisahan India’ (Partition of India) pada tahun 1947, yang membahagikan sub-benua ini kepada India dan Pakistan sebagaiman yang kita kenali sekarang. Pemisahan ini telah mewujudkan pertikaian berhubung pemilikan wilayah beraja, Jammu dan Kashmir. Pertikaian ini telah mengakibatkan tiga peperangan antara India dan Pakistan, dan pelbagai insiden bersenjata selama beberapa dekad yang lepas. Keadaan ini telah menyebabkan kedua-dua negara ini mula memiliki senjata senjata nuclear. Hal ini telah menyumbang kepada peningkatan ketegangan antara negara-negara tersebut. Teori cegah-rintang nuklear mendakwa bahawa pemilikan senjata nuklear boleh menghalang negara lain daripada menyerang dengan senjata nuklear mereka. Reaksi cegah-rintang ini timbul daripada kebimbangan mengenai kemungkinan tindak balas negara yang diserang. Tindak balas ini mungkin menyebabkan kemusnahan teruk. Artikel ini menganalisis kedinamikan cegah-rintang nuklear dalam menguruskan konflik peperangan antara India dan Pakistan. Pertamanya, artikel ini mengkaji wacana konseptual cegah-rintang nuklear, dan kedua membahaskan sifat perang dan konflik bersenjata di antara negara-negara ini.

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